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490 PEOPLE GRANADOS [49 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 6114. In Bank. Dec. 20, 1957.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. OSCAR MALDONADO 
GRANADOS. Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Witnesses and Ques-
tions.-Where the district attorney in a murder case asked 
decedent's brother whether decedent, 111 the course of a con-
versation with the brother, made any complaint to him, to 
which he answered, "Yes," whereupon the court said, "Just a 
moment please, objection sustained, answer stricken," defend-
ant was not prejudiced in view of the court's prompt ruling 
in sustaining an objection to the question and striking the 
answer. 
[2] !d.-Evidence-Accusatory Statements: Homicide-Evidence 
-State of Mind-Threats.-Evidence by decedent's mother in 
a murder case that in a conversation with defendant nearly 
three years prior to the offense she told him that the next 
time he bothered her daughter she would go to the police, to 
which he replied that the police would have to have more 
brains than he because if they left him alive he would kill the 
mother and her two children, was admissible as constituting 
an accusatory statement, as tending to establish prior threats 
of defendant toward decedent, and to show motive and de-
fendant's state of mind; an objection to the remoteness of 
such evidence went to its weight rather than to its admis-
sibility. 
[3] Id.- Appeal- Objections- Argument of CounseL-Alleged 
prejudicial error of the district attorney in a murder case 
in stating in his opening statement that decedent's brother 
would testify that about a year prior to the offense defendant 
sent him out to buy a paper and that when he returned his 
sister made an immediate complaint of a sexual proposition 
defendant had made to her was without merit where no objec-
tion was made to the statement. 
[4] Id.- Argument of Counsel- Opening Statements.-Opening 
statements of a prosecuting attorney are supposed to be an 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 400 et seq., Homicide, 
§§ 28, 199. 
[4] See Am.Jur., Trial, § 454 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 1371; [2] Criminal 
Law, § 453 (1); Homicide, §§58, 67; [3] Criminal Law, § 1092; 
[4] Criminal Law, § 598; [5] Criminal Law, § 619(2); (6] Homi-
cide, § 229; [7) Criminal Law, § 875; [8] Criminal Law, §§ 900, 
909(2); [9] Homicide,§ 145. 
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outline of what the People intend to prove, and failure to do 
so, whether on account of rules of evidence or otherwise, does 
not necessarily indicate prejudice. 
[5] !d.-Argument of Counsel-Scope-Inferences.-Alleged error 
of the prosecuting attorney in his argument to the jury in a 
murder case that he would like to examine some of the evidence 
in terms of the theory that defendant killed a 13-year-old 
girl in the course of committing or attempting to commit "a 
288 on her" was without merit where an objection to the 
unreasonableness of the inference being drawn from the evi-
dence was overruled and the court properly held that whether 
the inference made by the arguer was reasonable was a ques-
tion for the jury to decide. 
[6] Homicide-Instructions-Evidence-Reasonable Doubt.-In a 
prosecution for murder of a 13-year-old girl, it was error to 
refuse an instruction that if the jurors had a reasonable doubt 
that defendant committed a violation of Pen. Code, § 288, or 
attempted violation of such section, they could not return a 
verdict of guilty of first degree murder on the theory that there 
was an unlawful killing of a human being with malice afore-
thought in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a 
violation of the code section, since the instruction accurately 
stated the law and pinpointed the theory of the defense. 
[7] Criminal Law -Instructions- Degree of Proof-Reasonable 
Doubt.-Though Pen. Code, § 1096a, declares that when the 
statutory definition of reasonable doubt is given (Pen. Code, 
§ 1096) no other instruction need be given defining reasonable 
doubt, a defendant, on proper request therefor, has a right to 
an instruction that directs attention to evidence from a con-
sideration of which a reasonable doubt of his guilt could be 
engendered. 
[8] !d.-Instructions-Duties of Jurors.-An instruction in a mur-
der case that the discretion of jurors in considering the effect 
of evidence as proof is not absolute and that it is their duty 
to avoid fanciful theories and unreasonable inferences and not 
to resort to imagination or suspicion was properly refused 
where the court, among other things. instructed the jurors 
that it was their duty to try the issues of fact presented by 
the allegations in the information and defendant's plea of not 
guilty, that they should perform this duty uninfluenced by 
passion or prejudice against defendant, that neither the faet 
that defendant had been arrested nor the fact that an informa-
tion had been filed against him nor the fact that he had been 
brought before the court to stand trial was evidence of his 
guilt, and that they were not permitted to infer or to speculate 
from any or all of such facts that defendant was more likely 
to be guilty than innocent. · 
apron she was wearin:;; 
parts, hut that the skirt she waP 
above them. the murder was murder 
and a conviction of first murder 
taken under Pen Code, § 1239) 
Court of Los Angeles County. 
Modified with directions. 
Prosecution for murder of a girL Judgment of 
conviction of first murder modified and cause r0manded 
with directions to enter finding defendant guilty 
of second degree murder. 
Joseph M. Rosen for 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney GeneraL and Norman H. Soko-
low, Deputy Attorney for Respondent. 
McCOMB, J .-This is an automatic appeal from a judg-
ment pronouncing defendant guilty of murder in the first 
degt•ee after trial before a 
On October 1, 1956, defendant and Mrs. Minjarez were 
living as husband and wife. with her two children, Elvira 
(age 13) and Raul 14), at 316 N. Garey Street, Los 
Angeles. The four of them had been living as a family group 
approximately four or five years prior to such date. 
On the morning of October 1, 1956. defendant told Raul 
and Elvira that he was to take them to school to enrolL 
Mrs. bad gone to work He drove the 
children to a filling station across the street from the school, 
where he left them for 15 or 20 minutes. Upon his return he 
:mid the at the school stated that Raul and Elvira 
eould not go to the same schooL He further said he would 
discuss it with Mrs. and would go to school 
the next day. 




When Rani returned vi'ith the his mother had 
given he saw defendant at the r·ear the house. As 
he started to enter, defendant out, and told 
him to get some alcohol because his sister was fainting. Raul 
observed that there was blood on one of defendant's hands 
The other hand was behind his back. 
Raul went to the front house and looked for some alcohol 
but found none. Defendant then said they should go to the 
doctor and get an ambulance. At this time Raul noticed that 
defendant's hand had been washed and that it smelled like 
soap. 
Defendant and Raul then got into an automobile and pro-
ceeded toward Whittier. They in front of a drug 
store, and defendant gave Raul 50 cents, telling him to buy 
some alcohol, and said that he would drive around the block 
and pick him up. Defendant never returned to the place 
where he had left Raul. 
Shortly after leaving Raul, defendant telephoned Mrs. Min-
jarez and told her that her daughter had poisoned herself. 
Mrs. Minjarez immediately went to tlw premises at 316 N. 
Garey, but could not find her daughter. She then went for a 
Mr. Torres, who returned with her. They observed Officer 
Towles near the house and told him of their mission. The 
officer told Mr. Torres to look around outside the house and 
also in the rear house. 
Mr. Torres went inside the rear house and found Elvira's 
body in the bedroom lying on the floor. Her skirt was up 
above her private parts, and an apron over her dress was 
pulled down below them. Bare skin showed in the area of the 
hips, at the side of the apron, and above it was a wad of 
clothing, which was the skirt. 
There were blood stains on the wall, floor and decedent's 
head. In a corner of the living room behind a small gas 
h.eater was a machete covered with fresh blood. 
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Defendant testified that when he was about 9 or 10 years 
old he was in an accident in which a truck ran over him. 
causing head injuries, as a result of which he would go tem-
porarily blind and have very severe head pains; also that 
occasionally he would ''go haywire.'' During such spells he 
would have no recollection of his actions. 
He testified further that after lunch on October 1, 1956, he 
drank a can of beer; that Elvira was helping him clean the 
inside of the rear house; that the doors were open; and that 
during the course of the cleaning he asked Elvira if she was a 
virgin, to which she replied that it was none of his business. 
He said that she had never answered him like that before 
and he struck her on the face with his hand, but did not 
recall striking her with the machete; that he ''just went hay-
wire"; that he did not know what he was doing after that 
time; and that the next thing he remembered he was going 
out of the rear house. He also said that he saw Raul and told 
him something was wrong with Elvira and they were going to 
get a doctor; that he dropped Raul at a drug store; and that 
the next thing he remembered he was driving his automobile 
but he did not know where he was going. 
Defendant was arrested in El Paso, Texas, and was returned 
to Los Angeles by the authorities. 
[1] Defendant contends: First: The trial court committed 
prejudicial error in the admission of the following e.vidence: 
(a) During the examination of decedent's brother, Raul, 
the district attorney asked him: "Now in the course of the 
conversation [between decedent and Raul] did she make any 
complaint to you-would you answer that yes or noT" to 
which Raul answered, "Yes," whereupon the court said, "Just 
a moment, objection sustained, answer stricken." 
Clearly, in view of the court's prompt ruling in sustaining 
an objection to the question and striking the answer, defend-
ant was not prejudiced. 
[2] (b) Decedent's mother was permitted to testify rela-
tive to a conversation she had with defendant in September 
1953 to the effect that she told defendant that the next time 
he bothered her daughter she would go to the police and he 
replied that the police would have to have more brains than 
he because if they left him alive he would kill Mrs. Minjarez 
and her two children. 
Such evidence was admissible as constituting an accusatory 
statement, in that defendant was accused of molesting the 
Dee.1957] PEOPLE v. GRANADOS 
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child and told to stop, to which accusation he made no denial 
but instead threatened to kill; and the court properly over-
ruled an objection to the testimony on this ground. 
Such evidence was also admissible on the ground that it 
tended to establish prior threats of defendant toward decedent 
and was competent to show motive and the state of mind of 
defendant. The objection to the remoteness of such evidence 
goes to its weight rather than to its admissibility. (People v. 
Dement, 48 Cal.2d 600, 60,i [4] [311 P.2d 505]; People v. 
De Moss, 4 Cal.2d 469, 474 [4] [50 P.2d 1031]; People v. 
Flemming, 218 Cal. 300, 309 [3] [23 P.2d 28].) 
[3, 4] Second: The district attorney committed prejudicial 
error: 
(a) In his opening statement wherein he said Raul would 
testify that about a year prior to October 1, 1956, defendant 
sent him out to buy a paper when his mother was not home 
and that when Raul returned his sister made an immediate 
complaint of a sexual proposition defendant had made to her. 
This contention is devoid of merit for these reasons: (1) No 
objection was made to the statement, and (2) opening state-
ments are supposed to be an outline of what the People 
intend to prove, and failure to do so, whether on account of 
rules of evidence or otherwise, does not necessarily indicate 
prejudice. (People v. Planagan, 65 Cal.App.2d 371, 407 
[6] [150 P.2d 927].) 
[5] (b) In his argument to the jury when he said he would 
like to examine some of the evidence in terms of the theory 
that defendant killed Elvira in the course of committing or 
attempting to commit "a 288 on her." 
This alleged error is also without merit. Defendant ob-
jected on the ground that the inference the deputy district 
attorney was drawing from the evidence was unreasonable. 
The objection was overruled by the court, who properly held 
that whether the inference made by the arguer was reasonable 
or not was a question for the jury to decide. 
[6] Third: The trial court committed prejudicial error 
in not giving requested instruct1:ons: 
(a) That if the jurors had a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed a violation of section 288 of the Penal 
Code or attempted violation of said section on the date of 
October 1, 1956, then they could not return a verdict of guilty 
of first degree murder based upon the theory that there was 
an unlawful killing of a human being with malice afore-
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proper 
directs attention to 
a reasonable doubt his 
Kane, 27 Cal.2(1 693, 699 
v. Wilson, 100 
Plywood 
P.2d 587].) 
[8] (b) That the discretion of in considering the 
effect of evidence as proof is not absolute and that it is their 
duty to avoid fanciful theories and unreasonable inferences 
and not to resort to imagination or suspicion. 
This instruction was properly refused. 
The court did instruct the jurors that it was their duty 
to try the issues of fact by the allegations in the 
information and defendant's plea of not guilty; that they 
should perform this duty uninfluenced by passion or prejudice 
against defendant; that neither the fact that defendant had 
been arrested nor the fact that an information had been filed 
18eetion 288 of the Penal Code reads: ''Any person who shall wilfully 
and lewdly con.mit any lewd or lasci'"ious act including any of the acts 
constituting other crimes provided for in part one of this code upon or 
with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child under the ag<J 
of fourteen years, with the intent of appealing to, or gratifying 
the lust or passionB or sexual desires of person or of such child. 
shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the State prison for 
a term of from one year to life.'' 
•section 1096a of the Penal Code reads: "In charging a jury, the 
court may read to the jury section 1096 of this code, and no further 
instruction on the subject of the presumption of innocence or defining 
reasonable doubt need he given.'' 
'Section 1096 of the Penal Code reads: ''A defendant in a criminal 
action is presumed to be innorent until the contrary is proved, and in 
case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is 
entitled to an acquittal. but the effect of hi& presumption is only to 
place upon the state the burden of hirr. guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt. Reasonable doubt is as follows: 'It is not a mere 
possible <ioubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and de· 
pending -;,n moral is open or imaginary doubt. 
It is that state of the which, after entire comparison and 
consideration of all the leaves the minds of jurors in that 
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral 
certainty, of the truth of the charge.' " 
were not 
of such facts that 
PEOPLE v. GRANADOS 
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before the 
; and that they 
from any or an 
to be guilty 
were told that must be gov-
introdnced in the trial and the law 
forbade them to be 
passion. 
instruction» 
defendant is not in a to complain. 
(People V. 46 CaL2d 141. 150 [13] r292 P.2d 897].) 
[9] Fourth : The evidence is as a matter of law 
to sustain a conviction m1trder in the first degree. 
It is clear from the record that the prosecution for first 
degree murder was on the that defendant's 
act was an unlawful of a human with malice 
aforethought committed in the perpt>tration or attempted 
perpetration of a violation of section 288 of the Penal Code 
This was expressly stated by the district attorney in his open-
ing statement when he told the jury: "It is the theory of thf' 
People that this defendant killed in the course of committing 
a child molestation." 
The evidence is sufficient to sustain the finding of an unlaw-
ful killing of a human with malicf' aforethought, which 
establishe::: the crime of murder. there is a total 
absence of evidence that defendant violated or attempted to 
violate section 288 of the Penal Code. 
The record shows that defrndant asked decedent 
prior to the time of killing her whether she was a virgin and 
that when her dead was found. the apron she was wear-
ing came down below her parts. but that the skirt sh"' 
was wearing was above them. 
The testimony of the autopsy surgeor- disclosed no evidence 
of contusion or laceration on the parts of decedent's 
body, and a disclosed no spermatozoa. 
The foregoing eviilenre does not support a finding that de-
fendant had either or attempted to commit an act 
in violation of the of section 28fl of the Penal Code 
Hence, the murder in this case was murder of the second 
degree. 
The judgment of the trial court of murder of the first degree 
4!)8 PEOPLE GRAN ADOS [49 C.2d 
is modified and the cause remanded 
directions to enter 
guilty of murder in the second 
nounce judgment upon him as 
to the trial court with 
defendant finding him 
and thereupon to pro-
by law. 
c. and Schauer, concurred. 
J.-I dissent. 
While the evidence to show that defendant killed 
Elvira in the course or to commit an 
act with her section 288 of the Penal Code i~ 
much stronger than the evidence relied upon by the prosecu-
tion in the recent case of People v. Craig, ante, p. 313 [316 
P.2d 9471, as showing that the killing there was in the course 
of committing or attempting to commit rape, and the author 
of the majority opinion here with two of his associates 
in a dissenting in that case, f am nevertheless of the 
opinion that there is insufTicient evidence in the case at bar 
to show that the killing here was in the course of committing or 
attempting to commit an act prohibited by section 288 of the 
Penal Code. 
I do not, however, agree with the conclusion reached by the 
majority that the evidence fails to establish the crime of 
murder of the first degree or that the prosecution relies solely 
upon the contention that the verdict of murder of the first 
degree can be sustained solely on the theory that defendant 
killed Elvira in the course of committing or attempting to 
commit an act with her prohibited by section 288 of the Penal 
Code. In this connection I will quote the following excerpt 
from the brief of the attorney general : "While the Court 
instructed the jury that murder which is committed in the 
perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any act punishable 
under Penal Code Section 288 is murder of the first degree, 
the Court also instructed that murder perpetrated by any kind 
of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing is murder of 
the first degree .... We submit that there are circumstances 
reasonably supporting a finding that the killing was wilful, 
deliberate and premeditated. The machete ... is a heavy 
instrument. The fact that it was found near the body and 
appeared to be in a bloody condition, and the fact that there 
were wounds on the body which could have been inflicted by 
such an instrument, the conclusion that it was wielded 
by appellant .... There was evidence that it was about the 
premises prior to Elvira's death .... The autopsy testimony 
disclosed that the body of the deceased was brutally hacked. 
Dec. 499 
'!'he 
evidence includes Raul away 
prior to the and threat made 
Elvira and the other m_embers of the 
Vve submit that 
Stroble, 36 CaL2d 619-620 
'' ' each in 
manner inflict not merely 
injury or random mutilation. 'rhere 1s evidence apart frow 
defendant's confessions that before the child's death the im 
plements were at various about the An infer-
ence can be drawn that the killer who collected and used the 
implements had determined that he wished to bring about 
death and carried out that determinatwn. This, in the lighr 
of the other drcumstances including the charges against 
defendant whieh were then pending, is a sufficient prima facie 
showing of delit;eration and premeditation.' 
'' _E'or the foregoing reasons, we submit that the verdict 
of the jury in the case at bar was a proper one." 
The foregoing recitation of faets is m accordance with the 
record in this ease, and in my opinion fully supports the 
verdict of murder of the first degree. 
It also appears that the trial conrt correctly instructed 
the jury on the issues of premeditation and deliberation and 
there can be little doubt that the verdict of first degree 
murder was based upon a determination that the murder was 
the result of a wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing. 
I do not agree with the holding of the majority that the 
testimony of Elvira's mother relative to a threat made by the 
defendant in September, 1953 to kill her and her two children 
was admissible as constituting an accusatory statement as 
such testimony has none of the characteristics of an accusatory 
statement (People v. Simmons, 28 Cal.2d 699 [172 P.2d 18]). 
Such testimony was, however, admissible for the purpose of 
showing threats made by defendant toward decedent and his 
state of mind and motive which abundantly supports the 
determination by the that the mmder was the result of a 
wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing. 
For the foregoing reasons I would affirm the judgment. 
SPENCE, J.-I dissent. 
The prosecution has contended throughout the trial and 
appeal that the brutal murder of the 13-year-old girl consti-
500 
killing"; 
in the ~n·~n,,+~o+;:n~ or attempt tc an "act 
punishable under section 288. Code. 189.) The trial 
court gave instructions both theories, and. in my ,...,...,.,,,"" 
there was evidence conviction upon both 
With respect to it is established 
that the "lewd and 
of the Penal Code 
\'iolence or 
mere touching or 
child with the 
CaLApp.2d 276 P 2d 6941 ; v. Lett. 69 Cal.App.2d 
665 [160 P.2d 112]; People v. Lanham. 137 CaLApp. 737 ra1 
P.2d 410]; People v 37 778 [ 174 P 9161: 
People v. Dabner, 25 630 f144 P 975]; see also 
People v. Batsford, 91 Cai.App.2d 607 :205 P 2d 731] ; People 
v. Hartshorn, 59 CaLApp.2d 285 [138 P.2d 7821: People v 
Bronson, 69 Cal.App. 83 [230 P 213 J i It is further signifi 
cant that murder committed either in the perpetration of, or 
in the attempt to perpetrate, any act proscribed by section 288 
constitutes murder of the first 
In my opinion, it may be reasonably inferred from all the 
evidence that defendant's acts immediately preceding the 
killing were sex motivated, and that the murder was com-
mitted when the girl defendant's attempts to commit 
lewd acts "with the intent of appealing to, or 
gratifying [his] lust or or sexual desires." (Pen 
Code, § 288.) It is therefore wholly immaterial that no rapt> 
had actually been committed or, as stated iu the majority 
opinion, that ''The testimony of the autopsy surgeon dis. 
closed no evidence of contusion or laeeration on the privatf 
parts of decedent's body, and a microscopic examination dis-
closed no spermatozoa." 
As I am convinced from my review of the entire record 
that there was ample evidence to sustain the conviction of 
first degree murder, and that there wa>< no prejudicial error, 
I would affirm the judgment and the order denying a new 
trial. 
Shenk, J., concurred. 
